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Summary
Background: Uncertainty shapes our perception of the world
and the decisions we make. Two aspects of uncertainty are
commonly distinguished: uncertainty in previously acquired
knowledge (prior) and uncertainty in current sensory infor-
mation (likelihood). Previous studies have established that
humans can take both types of uncertainty into account, often
in a way predicted by Bayesian statistics. However, the neural
representations underlying these parameters remain poorly
understood.
Results: By varying prior and likelihood uncertainty in a deci-
sion-making task while performing neuroimaging in humans,
we found that prior and likelihood uncertainty had quite
distinct representations. Whereas likelihood uncertainty acti-
vated brain regions along the early stages of the visuomotor
pathway, representations of prior uncertainty were identified
in specialized brain areas outside this pathway, including
putamen, amygdala, insula, and orbitofrontal cortex. Further-
more, the magnitude of brain activity in the putamen pre-
dicted individuals’ personal tendencies to rely more on either
prior or current information.
Conclusions:Our results suggest different pathways bywhich
prior and likelihood uncertainty map onto the human brain
and provide a potential neural correlate for higher reliance on
current or prior knowledge. Overall, these findings offer
insights into the neural pathways that may allow humans to
make decisions close to the optimal defined by a Bayesian
statistical framework.
Introduction
Uncertainty is intrinsic to our world. For any given event, there
is uncertainty in what our senses currently tell us—this is*Correspondence: iris-vilares@northwestern.eduusually denoted likelihood uncertainty. There is also uncer-
tainty in our preexisting knowledge of that event—this is
known as prior uncertainty. For example, when judging the
probability of rain, we combine current information obtained
through our senses (are there clouds visible in the sky?) with
previous acquired knowledge we possess about the chance
of rain at our particular location (are we in Lisbon or London?).
In such cases, the uncertainty associated with each piece of
information determines how we should combine them. The
combination of information gathered in the past (prior) with
new information (likelihood) is critical for effective decision
making [1] and can thus be seen as a central objective of the
nervous system.
Bayesian statistics describe how prior and likelihood infor-
mation can be optimally combined as a function of their
respective uncertainties to give a posterior probability esti-
mate. The uncertainty of this optimal estimate (posterior
uncertainty or general uncertainty) is generally smaller than
the uncertainty associated with either prior or likelihood alone
[2]. Several recent studies comparing Bayesian predictions to
human behavior show that humans are close to optimal in
a wide range of tasks, including estimation [3], learning [4],
and movement [5–7]. The fact that behavior was close to the
Bayesian optimal in these tasks indicates that human partici-
pants detect and use information about both prior and likeli-
hood uncertainty. Nevertheless, in spite of a large body of
behavioral research, it is still unclear how and where these
types of uncertainty are represented in the brain.
Given that uncertainty is fundamental to behavior, there is an
extensive modeling literature that hypothesizes how it could
be represented. However, these different theoretical models
do not tend to distinguish between the representation of priors
and likelihoods. Also, they differ in their predictions of where
uncertainty should be represented [8–12]. One set of theories
assumes that uncertainty is a fundamental part of the way
any pair of neurons exchanges information, and thus the repre-
sentation of the uncertainty of a variable is always colocalized
with the representation of the variable itself [8, 10]. A different
set of theories assumes that there are specialized brain
regions that encode and process uncertainty [9, 11–13].
Although these theories are not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive, they offer different predictions, and none so far has
received strong neurobiological support. It thus remains
unknown whether uncertainty is represented along the senso-
rimotor pathway or within specialized brain areas outside
this pathway and whether different forms of uncertainty have
different representations.
To try to find the neural correlates of uncertainty, several
studies in monkeys have analyzed how uncertainty in a stim-
ulus can change neural firing. For instance, in a classic visual
discrimination task,monkeys view a cloud of randomlymoving
dots and need to identify their net direction [14, 15]. Varying the
percentage of dots with a coherent motion demonstrated that
the activity of neurons in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP)
represents not only the direction of the stimulus but also the
uncertainty associated with it [15]. Such studies can be inter-
preted as changing the likelihood. Other studies have changed
the probability that even before seeing the stimulus a monkey
Figure 1. Experimental Setup
(A) Illustration of the task. Subjects guess the position of a hidden target (the
‘‘coin,’’ represented by the yellow dot) using a net (vertical blue bar), which
they can displace horizontally. At the onset of each trial, subjects receive
noisy information about the position of the hidden target in the form of
a set of five blue dots (the likelihood). Subjects then move the net to the
guessed position and press the mouse button to confirm their choice, after
which the true target position is displayed. If the target is inside the net, the
score increases by one point (see also Supplemental Information and Fig-
ure S1). A new trial then begins 1,500 ms later. Left shows illustration of
the computer display that was presented to the subjects. Right shows
typical time course of a trial.
(B) The four conditions of the experiment. The experiment consisted of
a two-by-two factorial design, with two types of prior (p = narrow prior;
P = wide prior) and two types of likelihood (l = narrow likelihood; L = wide
likelihood). The wider conditions are the ones with more associated uncer-
tainty.
Current Biology Vol 22 No 18
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modulated neuronal activity [16]. These studies can be inter-
preted as changing the prior [14]. However, all of these studies
are based on relatively simple oculomotor tasks, with a focus
on very specific brain areas. It remains poorly understood
whether neural representations of uncertainty are also en-
coded elsewhere in the brain and whether the findings in
monkeys translate to other experimental tasks and settings
in humans.
Interesting recent human studies in neuroeconomics have
started to examine how uncertainty about reward is repre-
sented. These studies show that increased uncertainty about
whether a reward is going to be obtained (risk) correlates
with increased activations in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
[17, 18], midbrain [11], cingulate cortex [18, 19], and insula
[9, 20; for a review, see 21]. However, in all these cases, uncer-
tainty was treated as one single parameter, and thus general
uncertainty was perfectly correlated with prior or likelihood
uncertainty, which were not distinguished as separate
sources of uncertainty. Thus, although in humans there is
an increasing knowledge of where uncertainty in reward is
represented, it is still unclear where prior and likelihood uncer-
tainty are and whether these areas coincide with the areas
involved in uncertainty in reward.
Here we devised a sensory-motor decision-making task in
which human subjects could use both prior and likelihood to
estimate positions of hidden visual targets. Uncertainty was
systematically varied on each trial in a two-by-two factorial
design, such that two of the conditions were matched for
performance accuracy but differed in the relative balance of
prior and likelihood uncertainty. By combining event-related
fMRI approaches with computational models of behavioral
performance, we were able to characterize the neural repre-
sentations of the two kinds of uncertainty while controlling
for confounding factors related to expected reward. The
behavioral results indicate that subjects are adept at using
both kinds of uncertainty to optimize performance, in keeping
with Bayesian predictions. The imaging results suggest that
likelihood uncertainty is primarily represented in the early
stages of the sensorimotor network, whereas prior uncertainty
is represented in limbic and paralimbic decision-related areas
outside of traditional sensorimotor pathways. Together these
findings suggest fundamentally different representations by
which prior and likelihood uncertainty in a decision-making
task map onto the human brain.
Results
In this study, we wanted to know where prior and likelihood
uncertainty are represented in the human brain. To this end,
we developed a visual decision-making task in which subjects
had to guess the position of a hidden target (a ‘‘coin’’) on
a computer screen (see Figure 1A and [6, 22]). Subjects were
given noisy visual information about the target position in the
form of a dot-cloud drawn from a Gaussian distribution
centered at the true target position. To successfully estimate
the position of the target, subjects could use both the likeli-
hood, obtained from the displayed dots, and the prior, ob-
tained from the distribution of previous target positions.
Uncertainty in the likelihood varies with the dispersion of the
displayed dots. This dispersion varied randomly from trial to
trial and thus could not be predicted beforehand. The average
position of the target (the mean of the prior) was the middle
of the screen, and subjects could estimate its uncertainty(prior uncertainty) from the distribution of target positions in
previous trials (see Experimental Procedures and Supple-
mental Information for details). Given that subjects had ample
Figure 2. Behavioral Results
(A) Estimates of the target position for one representative subject are shown
as a function of the centroid of the displayed dots (likelihood). Displayed
next to the graphs is the slope value of the linear regressions (solid line).
The dashed line represents what the linear regression would look like if
the subject only used likelihood information (slope = 1). The horizontal
dotted line represents a potential situation in which only prior information
is taken into account (slope = 0, localized at 0.5, which is the middle of
the screen and the mean of the prior).
(B) Average slope of the linear regression for the behavior of the 15 subjects
during the scanning session, separated by condition. The slope quantifies
the degree to which subjects rely on the current visual stimulus (likelihood)
versus the prior. The small blue rectangles represent the optimal Bayesian
values (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures for details).
(C) Average proportion of trials in which the subject accurately guessed
the position of the target, separated by condition. Error bars in (B) and (C)
represent 95% confidence intervals for the mean (SEM). Inset shows that
there is a significant effect of both prior and likelihood uncertainty. n.s. =
nonsignificant, p > 0.05; *** significant, p < 0.001. See also Figure S2.
Prior and Likelihood Uncertainty Representations
1643experience with the task from the behavioral experiment, they
quickly acquired the prior. Successful estimates of the posi-
tion were rewarded with points, which had motivational sig-
nificance to the subjects (see Supplemental Information and
Figure S1). The conditions comprised a two-by-two factorial
design (Figure 1B), with two levels of prior uncertainty (wide,
more uncertain prior: P; and narrow, less uncertain prior: p)
and two levels of likelihood uncertainty (wide likelihood:
L; and narrow likelihood: l). Varying the uncertainty in the
prior and in the likelihood independently, together with fMRI
imaging, allowed us to find where they are represented in the
brain.
Prior and Likelihood Uncertainty Affect Behavior
We first wanted to know whether variations of prior and likeli-
hood uncertainty in our task influence the estimation behavior.
If subjects ignore the prior information and rely only on the
current sensory feedback (i.e., likelihood information) then
the weight of sensory feedback (slopes of Figure 2A) in the
estimation should be one. On the other hand, if subjects rely
only on their prior knowledge and ignore likelihood informa-
tion, then the weight of the sensory feedback should be
zero. Use of this metric demonstrated that scanned subjects
relied on both prior and likelihood information (0 < slope < 1;
Figure 2B). Data obtained from all subjects (both those who
were scanned and those who were not) showed the same
effects (Figure S2A). Furthermore, subjects relied more on
the likelihood information as the prior uncertainty increased
and as the likelihood uncertainty decreased (main effect of
prior, F1,43 = 207, p < 10
26; main effect of likelihood, F1,43 =
35, p < 1026, ANOVA repeated-measures [r.m.]). Qualitatively,
such behavior would be expected if they used a Bayesian
strategy [23] (see also Supplemental Information). Thus, in
our experiment, subjects utilized knowledge of both prior
and likelihood uncertainty for perceptual decision-making.
Both kinds of uncertainty may be expected to change the
precision of subjects’ estimates and thus their expected task
performance. Not surprisingly, performance was better when
each of the uncertainties was lower (Figure 2C, main effect of
prior, F1,43 = 161, p < 10
26; main effect of likelihood, F1,43 =
84, p < 1026, ANOVA r.m.). Importantly, despite the fact that
the slopes, and thus the relative weighting of the uncertain
sources of information, differed significantly between the pL
and Pl conditions (Figure 2B, p < 1 3 1024, W = 0, Wilcoxon
signed rank test), estimation performance between these
two conditions was matched (Figure 2C; Figure S2C, p >
0.05, W = 31, Wilcoxon signed rank test). Even testing estima-
tion performance on each individual subject did not reveal
any significant difference between these two conditions (p >
0.05 for each subject, corrected for multiple comparisons,
comparing two proportions test). Therefore, as noted below,
a comparison of these two conditions should provide a robust
way to infer imaging-based differences between prior and
likelihood uncertainty, while minimizing potential confounds
due to differences in general uncertainty, performance, or
reward expectation.
Prior and Likelihood Uncertainty Have Distinct Neural
Representations
The uncertainty associated with the prior affects behavior
(Figure 2B). We thus wanted to ask if and where it affects
BOLD activities (see Supplemental Information for details).
We found that areas more active with increased uncertainty
in the prior include putamen, amygdala, insula, and OFC(p < 0.05 whole-brain corrected; familywise error (FWE) level;
Figure 3A). Cross-validated condition-specific activation
profiles (Figure 3B) demonstrate that the activation in each of
these regions is specifically related with prior uncertainty,
and not likelihood uncertainty. Please note that, because in
our design there is no ‘‘zero prior uncertainty’’ condition, no
real baseline exists, and thus what is relevant in the activation
profiles is the relative difference between conditions. There
was a significant main effect of prior uncertainty (all regions
depicted are significant at p < 0.01, F > 9; except left amygdala,
with a p = 0.059, F1,43 = 3.76; ANOVA r.m.), with no significant
main effects of likelihood (F1,43 < 0.73, p > 0.05; ANOVA r.m.).
Even if we use a 2-fold cross-validation, the same results still
hold (see Supplemental Information for details). We did not
find any imaging evidence of an interaction between priors
and likelihoods (for additional tests and controls, see Supple-
mental Information and Figure S3A). Areas more active with
Figure 3. Brain RegionsMore Active duringWide
(More Uncertain) Prior Conditions
(A) Stronger activations associated with high
(versus low) prior uncertainty were seen bilater-
ally in the putamen, amygdala, insula (top;
y = 0), and OFC (bottom; y = 26). Functional acti-
vations are overlaid on coronal sections of the
average of each subject’s T1-weighted structural
brain scan (display threshold at p < 0.0001 unc.,
minimum 10 voxels; n = 15). Activity in the right in-
sula and left OFC appears at a less stringent p
value (p < 0.001; data not shown). In this and all
subsequent figures, the right side of the brain
corresponds to the right side of the image.
(B) Percent signal change (PSC) by condition in
the areas represented in (A). Data were extracted
from the peak (most significant) voxel in each
cluster using a leave-one-subject-out cross-
validation procedure (see Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures for details). Plots represent
the subject-averaged parameter estimates con-
verted to PSC for the four conditions (n = 15).
Error bars represent SEM. See also Figure S3.
Figure 4. Brain Regions More Active during Higher Likelihood Uncertainty
Conditions
(A) Stronger activations associated with high (versus low) likelihood uncer-
tainty were seen bilaterally in the superior occipital cortex (z = 22). Func-
tional activations are overlaid on the axial section of the subject-averaged
scan (n = 15).
(B) Condition-specific percent signal change in the left occipital area shows
a main effect of likelihood uncertainty significant at p < 0.0001, with no
significant main effect of prior (p > 0.05). Data were extracted using
a leave-one-subject-out cross-validation procedure. The same results
hold if using a 2-fold cross-validation procedure. The data plot represents
the average parameter estimates (6SEM, cross-validated) converted to
percentage signal change for the four conditions.
(C) Brain regions parametrically correlated with higher likelihood uncer-
tainty. Stronger activations associated with a parametric increase in likeli-
hood uncertainty (SD of the displayed dots at each trial) were seen bilaterally
in the superior occipital cortex, extending down all the way to the calcarine
sulcus and lingual gyrus (y = 88; z = 22). Functional activations are overlaid
on the axial (up) and coronal (down) sections of the subject-averaged scan
(for all functional activations shown, display threshold is at p < 0.0001 unc.,
minimum 10 voxels; n = 15). See also Figure S4.
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and/or confidence) encompassed the caudate nucleus,
prefrontal cortex and areas adjacent to the anterior cingulate
cortex (see Figure S3B). Together, these results suggest that
wide regions of the brain, primarily outside of the traditional
sensory-motor pathway, encode prior uncertainty.
Given that activity related to prior uncertainty encompassed
a wide set of regions, we wanted to know whether the uncer-
tainty associated with the currently presented stimulus (the
likelihood uncertainty) leads to activity in the same areas.
We should expect that a neural representation exists, given
that likelihood uncertainty also affected behavior (Figure 2B).
Areas more active with high versus low likelihood uncertainty
were localized to bilateral regions of superior occipital visual
cortex (p < 0.05 FWE corrected; see Figure 4) and nowhere
else in the brain at this threshold (see Supplemental Informa-
tion and Figure S4A for controls). Taking advantage of the
fact that the degree of likelihood uncertainty differed on every
trial (where greater dot dispersion corresponded to higher
visual variance and higher likelihood uncertainty) and that
the between-trial variability in dot position produces some
overlap between the low and high likelihood uncertainty
groups (see Supplemental Information and Figures S4B and
S4C), we also implemented a parametric fMRI model to test
whether dot-dispersion variance modulated the same areas
of occipital cortex on a trial-by-trial basis. This model revealed
the same bilateral activations in the superior occipital visual
cortex. These activations increased parametrically with the
increase in likelihood uncertainty, had a higher level of signif-
icance, and extended all the way to the calcarine sulcus and
lingual gyrus (p < 0.05 FWE corrected; Figure 4C). Likelihood
uncertainty in our task thus seems to affect BOLD signal
mainly in areas corresponding to the early stages of the visuo-
motor pathway.
Correlations across Subjects between Prior-Related
Behavior and Activations
Thus far, we have analyzed how the two factors, prior and like-
lihood uncertainty, affect activities in the brain, and identified
a small number of key regions. For those analyses, we did
not use observed behavior but rather the experimentally andmathematically defined uncertainties. However, if any of these
brain regions are involved in the decision-making process,
then we should expect them to be correlated with behavioral
Figure 5. Relationship between Prior Uncertainty-Related Brain Activity and Behavioral Measures
(A–C) Prior uncertainty differences in activation for individual participants at the right putamen (A; peak at 30, 22, 22), left putamen (B; peak at 222, 0, 4),
andOFC (C; peak at 22, 26,212) are regressed against individuals’ sensitivity to prior change. Presented on the graphics are the respective Spearman corre-
lations.
(D) Prior uncertainty differences in activation for individual participants at the right putamen (peak at 30, 22, 22) are regressed against the average weight
given to likelihood versus prior information (the slope). Presented on the graphic is the respective Spearman correlation.
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and Supplemental Information).
We hypothesized that subjects who were able to better
detect the changes in prior uncertainty (i.e., those who
changed more of their behavior when the prior uncertainty
changed) could also show higher differences in brain activity
between the two prior conditions. This is indeed what was
observed for both the right and left putamen (Figures 5A and
5B, r = 0.65 and r = 0.61, p < 0.02, Spearman correlation) and
the OFC (Figure 5C, r = 0.66, p < 0.01, Spearman correlation).
The other reported areas (namely, amygdala and insula) did
not show a significant correlation. These results suggest
that, besides tracking prior uncertainty, putamen and OFC
might be directly related with behavioral change.
We also wanted to look for a behavioral measure that could
represent a specific ‘‘personality trait.’’ The average slope of
a subject (averaged over the four conditions) can provide
such a measure, because a higher value indicates that
subjects on average tend to rely more on current sensory
information and less on prior knowledge, and vice versa.
Indeed, as we have seen above, subjects varied behaviorally
in how much, on average, they relied on prior information(see Figure 2) and also varied in their mean fMRI activation
response to uncertainty in prior-related brain areas (see Fig-
ure 3). We found that this average slope was positively corre-
lated with the degree of differential brain activation in the right
putamen (Figure 5D, r = 0.66, p < 0.01, Spearman correlation).
Note that the effect in the putamen (in terms of difference
between conditions) is actually the highest compared to the
other brain areas (see Table S1). This finding raises the possi-
bility that a general higher involvement of the putamen in the
task, potentially by signaling greater prior uncertainty, may
enhance learning from new sensory information, and therefore
subjects in whom the putamen is more engaged tend to rely
more on new than in prior information.
Online Representation of Bayesian Slopes
We wanted to ask how the brain computes prior versus likeli-
hood information online in order to arrive at a sensorimotor
decision. For that decision, at each trial the subject needs to
decide how much to weigh the likelihood relative to the prior.
If subjects behave as predicted by Bayesian statistics, then
this slope can be estimated for each trial (see Experimental
Procedures and Supplemental Information for details). Testing
Figure 6. Brain Regions Parametrically Correlated with the Instantaneous
Bayesian Slope
Stronger activations associated with a parametric increase in the instanta-
neous Bayesian slope (a measure that indicates how much the subject
weights prior and likelihood information, at each trial) were seen in the right
superior medial prefrontal cortex (y = 48; z = 32). Functional activations are
overlaid on the coronal section (left) and axial (right) sections of the subject-
averaged scan (display threshold at p < 0.0001 uncorrected, minimum 10
voxels).
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and BOLD activation, we found significant decision-related
activations in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), roughly in Brodmann
area 9 (p < 0.0001 uncorrected [unc.], see Figure 6). This
finding suggests a possible role of prefrontal cortex in
combining prior and likelihood information to estimate the
target’s position.
Discussion
In this study, we tested where prior and likelihood uncertainty
are represented in the brain. We were particularly interested
in knowing the following: (1) Are prior and likelihood uncer-
tainty represented in the same set of areas? (2) Is uncertainty
for visuomotor tasks represented in the traditional visuomo-
tor pathway or in specialized areas? By combining a psycho-
physical paradigm with fMRI analysis in which two of the
conditions were matched for performance and posterior
uncertainty, we could disentangle the specific effects of prior
and likelihood uncertainty. We found that greater prior uncer-
tainty evoked increased brain activity in specialized brain
areas that include the putamen, amygdala, OFC, and parts
of the insula. In contrast, greater likelihood uncertainty
primarily affected neural activities in the occipital cortex, in
areas that belong to the traditional visuomotor pathway. Prior
and likelihood uncertainty were thus represented in largely
nonoverlapping areas, highlighting the importance of distin-
guishing between these kinds of uncertainty.
There are numerous reasons why the brain could use a
strategy where prior uncertainty is processed in these special-
ized brain areas. Computationally, the forming of a prior results
from integration over time, requiring long-term memory, and
may bemore difficult to implement in domain-specific sensory
and/or motor brain areas. Anatomically, OFC, amygdala,
putamen, and insula receive inputs from sensory areas, which
are needed to build a prior, and project to motor effector
systems in the brainstem and cortex [12, 24–26], which are
needed to use the prior. These connections may allow the
optimization of behavior in the context of varying prior uncer-
tainty and, if the prior is too uncertain, facilitate behavior
change to gather relevant new information [26]. Additionally,
these areas are connected or even directly involved with
reward processing [11, 21, 24] and could thus more easilycombine the need for more information with its potential
value. Moreover, previous research has highlighted their
involvement in uncertainty in reward [12, 17, 18, 20, 27] and,
more specifically, in signaling ambiguity and the need to learn
more about the world [13]. Thus, computational demands,
anatomical connections, and previous research support the
involvement of these areas in signaling prior uncertainty.
Likelihood uncertainty, in contrast, was associated with
activations in areas that are part of the traditional visuomotor
pathway. Our task is visual, and thus information about the
task is also transmitted through the same route. Hence, these
results concur with the hypothesis presented by theoretical
models, such as probabilistic population codes and sampling
theories [8, 10], that likelihood uncertainty is part of the
inherent code by which neurons transmit information. Accord-
ing to thesemodels, the activity of the same neurons transmits
information (e.g., the position) along with uncertainty about
this information. From a computational perspective, sensory
information needs to be continuously used to calculate esti-
mates of likelihood uncertainty [4], and hence sensory areas
seem best suited for this ongoing update. Indeed, previous
studies in human visual perception have also found that uncer-
tainty affects brain activity in the corresponding sensory areas
[28, 29], and, moreover, they found that activity in visual areas
was higher when the visual stimulus was more uncertain
[28, 30, 31]. This occurred for random vs. nonrandom dot
motion [31], incoherent vs. coherent shapes [30], and blurry
vs. nonblurry images [29], indicating that the effects observed
are not exclusive to the particular stimulus we used. Together,
our results suggest that likelihood uncertainty about a visual
stimulus may be processed along with the stimulus itself in
the visual cortex.
For Bayesian decision-making, the brain needs not only to
compute prior and likelihood uncertainty but also to use
them for appropriate weighting of both pieces of information.
Activity in the brain areas where this occurs should then relate
to these weights, which depend nonlinearly on both uncer-
tainties. We found that an area in the PFC tracks the trial-by-
trial weight on current versus prior information. This area
would then be a candidate area to receive information from
both prior and likelihood uncertainty and calculate accordingly
how much weight should be placed on new information.
Indeed, the PFC is known for its role in planning and cognitive
control [32] and, interestingly, has even been specifically
associated with Bayesian decision-making [33]. Our results
thus suggest how a network of brain areas may give rise to
Bayesian instantiations of perception and behavior.
Although our study focused on the integration of priors with
visual information, uncertainty may be represented differently
for other sensory modalities or tasks. Our task dealt with
a new, rapidly acquired prior over a series of trials, in which
subjects, during each trial, had unlimited time to make a deci-
sion. Hence, it can be considered a cognitive task. Studies
using different kinds of tasks, but that were also cognitive,
have previously associated the prior-uncertainty areas
identified here with decision-making and reward uncertainty
[11, 18, 20, 34], making it more likely that our results would
hold for other types of cognitive tasks as well. However, it is
possible that other types of priors, such as the ones involved
in early sensory perception (e.g., ‘‘light from above’’), which
might have been learned over many years (or even genera-
tions), have distinct representations [35]. As for likelihood
uncertainty, if indeed it is transmitted concurrently with the
sensory information itself, then a nonvisual task should
Prior and Likelihood Uncertainty Representations
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help to answer these questions, for example by applying
a computationally equivalent task in which the sensory feed-
back information given is not visual but, say, olfactory or
auditory, or by implementing a faster, more unconscious
sensory perception task.
The association of specific brain areas with prior uncertainty
and potentially with subjects’ individual tendency to rely on
new sensory information (as is the case for putamen) may
have implications for the understanding of learning disabilities
and abnormal decision-making behavior. Learning, in a
Bayesian sense, can be interpreted as the weight given to
new evidence over prior beliefs [36]. If the prior is more certain,
then less learning from new information should occur, and vice
versa [36]. Changes in the brain areas that represent prior
uncertainty might then lead, for example, to an underestima-
tion of prior uncertainty, potentially affecting learning from
new information. Interestingly, it has been found that patients
with damage to the amygdala [34], OFC [13], insula [37], and
putamen [38] show considerable deficits in making decisions
that involve uncertainty and learning from feedback, and that
the existence of intact connections between these structures
is essential for learning from new sensory information [39,
40]. If indeed one of the reasons why these deficits occur is
based on an underestimation of prior uncertainty, then these
could potentially be reversed by providing more certain
current sensory information or by giving explicit information
about prior uncertainty.
The finding of the areas involved in prior and likelihood
uncertainty representation provides insight for an ongoing
debate in the computational literature: is uncertainty part of
the general code by which neurons exchange information
and thus it is encoded in every neuron’s output [8, 10], or are
there specialized areas that deal with the encoding of uncer-
tainty [9, 11–13]? Our findings suggest that both of these
hypotheses might be correct but for different kinds of uncer-
tainty: likelihood uncertainty seems intrinsically embodied in
the stimulus encoding itself, because it is represented
in sensorimotor areas, whereas prior uncertainty is encoded
in specialized areas. Future models of brain function should
take into account uncertainty in the prior and in the likelihood
separately, because both their neural representations and
their behavioral effects are distinct.
Experimental Procedures
Subjects
Twenty-seven healthy subjects (12 women; age range 19–35 years; mean
age = 27 years) participated in the experiment. Of these, 17 participated in
the fMRI experiment, from which data from 15 were used (9 women). All
participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
were naı¨ve to the goals of the experiment, signed consent forms, and
were paid to participate. Subjects that only performed the behavioral
part of the experiment were paid $20. Subjects that performed both the
behavioral and the fMRI parts of the experiment were paid $70. All protocols
were approved by the Northwestern University IRB.
Behavioral Task
Subjects performed a decision-making task, which consisted of guessing
the position of a hidden coin on a screen, in a task similar to one described
in prior studies [6, 22]. Subjects were told the cover story of a coin being
tossed into a pond and informed that their task was to guess where the
coin had fallen. They could not see the coin, but they could see five blue
dots that were the ‘‘splashes’’ produced by the coin falling in. They were
told that the person who threw the coin aimed, albeit imperfectly, at the
center of the screen (mean of prior). They were also told that, between
blocks, the thrower changed, and the new one might be better or worseat throwing (i.e., they were indirectly informed that the variance of the prior
changed). To estimate the coin position, subjects could use (although they
were never explicitly told so) both the coin position’s likelihood, obtained
from the ‘‘splashes,’’ and its prior (the distribution of previous coin loca-
tions). There was no temporal deadline.
Stimuli
The position of the coin was drawn from a Gaussian distribution, centered
on the center of the screenwith a SD that was either low (sp = 2.5%of screen
width) or high (sP = 8.5% of screen width). This distribution was the prior of
the experiment. Subjects were given themean of the prior (‘‘the coin throw is
aimed at the screen center’’) but not its variance, which they could only
estimate from the distribution of previous coin throws. The SD of the prior
was kept constant within blocks but changed across blocks. On every trial,
a cluster of five dots was shown on the screen. The x-position of each of
these dots was drawn independently from a second Gaussian distribution
in which the mean was the coin’s horizontal location on that trial and the
SD was either low (sl = 6%) or high (sL = 15%). The distribution of these
five dots defined the likelihood. The SD of the likelihood was varied pseu-
dorandomly from trial to trial but counterbalanced across trials. We made
the SD of the likelihood vary pseudorandom from trial to trial so that
subjects could not predict a priori the overall uncertainty that the trial would
have. In total, there were thus four conditions: low prior uncertainty and low
likelihood uncertainty (pl), low prior uncertainty and high likelihood uncer-
tainty (pL), high prior uncertainty and low likelihood uncertainty (Pl), and
high prior uncertainty and high likelihood uncertainty (PL). See Supple-
mental Information for more details.
Procedure: Behavioral Session
See Supplemental Information for details.
Procedure: fMRI session
From the 27 subjects recruited for the behavioral task, 17 were asked to re-
turn and perform the same task while undergoing fMRI (See Supplemental
Information for details).
Data Analysis
We used a Bayesianmodel to understand the behavior of the subjects in our
task (see Supplemental Information for details).
fMRI Data Acquisition, Processing, and Analysis
See Supplemental Information and Tables S1–S3 for details.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes four figures, three tables, Supplemental
Results, and Supplemental Experimental Procedures and can be found with
this article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2012.07.010.
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